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Australia’s Boatpeople Policy:
Regional Cooperation
or Passing the Buck?
Christopher C. White
Livingstone College

Abstract:
The Australian government implemented a new policy in July 2013 in an
attempt to more effectively address the recent spike in irregular migrants
trying to reach its shores. In this paper, I examine the panic over
migration in Australia concerning asylum seekers arriving by boat. The
discussion is divided into two main themes. First, I look at how the
Australian government is attempting to manage irregular immigration
with a specific focus on the regional arrangement with Papua New Guinea.
I argue that instead of mutually beneficial efforts at regional cooperation,
the Australian government is merely shifting its responsibilities to a
developing country. Second, I discuss the panic over the “boatpeople” and
argue the situation has been exaggerated and overstates the scale of the
problem.
Keywords: International migration, asylum seekers, regional
cooperation, Australia, Oceania, immigration, international law
1. Introduction:

The ability to manage the movement of people across national
borders is usually seen as one of the primary responsibilities of the nationstate, but by its very nature international migration always involves more
than one country. The world has become increasingly globalized and
international migration has followed suit. The vast majority of states have
come to realize that successful and effective migration policies involve
cooperation and coordination with other states, sometimes by choice and
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sometimes by necessity. However, these efforts, both regionally and
globally, are often highly contentious and result in conflict internally and
externally.
This paper examines efforts to manage migration in a regional
context with a specific focus on the Oceania region, but also involves a
global component as the vast majority of the migrants in question come
from outside the region. Furthermore, the study incorporates two main
themes that are highly connected and integrates border studies theory into
the analysis. Although the world is becoming increasingly globalized,
borders still matter and are particularly important with respect to
international migration. Borders shape our notions of place, identity,
community, culture, legal standing, nationality, and so forth. Naples
(2010) suggests a distinction between “social science based borderlands
studies and cultural studies-oriented border theory,” but the approach in
this paper is interdisciplinary and is not designed to prefer one perspective
over the other.
The first theme involves the Australian government’s attempt to
manage irregular maritime immigration through the implementation of
regional arrangements with neighboring countries, primarily with Papua
New Guinea. The Australian federal election on September 7, 2013
resulted in a major change in government, and it is therefore necessary to
cover the immigration policies of both the previous and current
governments. The so-called PNG Solution, which will be discussed in
greater detail in a later section, was actually concluded under the previous
government and it was transformed into a broader action called Operation
Sovereign Borders that began on September 18, 2013, less than two weeks
after the federal election.
The second theme involves the panic in Australia over irregular
maritime arrivals (IMAs), or asylum-seekers colloquially known as
“boatpeople.” The central argument is that the Australian government is
merely shifting its responsibilities to developing countries instead of
engaging in mutually beneficial efforts at regional cooperation, a clear
instance of buck-passing, and that the situation has been exaggerated and
overstates the scale of the problem. Border studies will play a key role in
the discussion of the political, economic, historical, and cultural dynamics
between Australia and Papua New Guinea, as these are essential aspects
when considering the regional arrangement between these two countries.
The paper concludes with some general observations related to the issues
of boatpeople and regional arrangements.
2. International Migration and the Oceania Region:
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The terms asylum seeker and refugee are sometimes used
interchangeably, which reflects the confusion related to irregular
migration, and especially for migrants who are fleeing persecution and
other difficult situations. According to the UN Refugee Agency (2013a),
“An asylum-seeker is someone who says he or she is a refugee, but whose
claim has not yet been definitively evaluated.” It is important to note that
refugee status confers a certain legal status under international law, such
that some asylum seekers may eventually be recognized as refugees while
others will not.
This paper is focused on the Australian government’s response to
increasing numbers of irregular maritime arrivals and does not include an
examination of those that arrive via other methods. The Oceania region is
an intriguing case study of international migration in that nearly every
state in the region is an island and is unique with respect to border studies,
as opposed to Europe, for example, where many countries share multiple
borders with their neighbors. Travel among these South Pacific states
involves long distances and is therefore far more challenging and costly in
comparison to other regions where cross-border migration is possible.
Migrants traveling to Australia must either arrive via plane or boat, a far
different dynamic than a landlocked country with multiple shared borders.
Migration in the 21st century is often characterized by movement
from the Global South to the Global North, or from poorer, developing
countries to richer, developed countries as people leave their countries of
origin in search of greater economic opportunities in destination
countries. Immigration tends to take on a particularly divisive tone in
developed countries, and it has been an extraordinary challenge for
governments to maintain effective immigration policies while
simultaneously addressing the concerns of domestic constituencies. The
native-born populations in destination countries are concerned
immigrants will take jobs, drain government resources, and fail to
integrate and assimilate successfully into the host society.
The Australian government, like the majority of its peer member
states in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), tends to view immigration in general and boatpeople in
particular as a problem. In both policy and media debates immigration is
cast in an overwhelmingly negative light. The public sees these
immigrants as unwanted and undesirable, and tends to have little interest
in looking into any potential benefits that might result from immigration.
The liberal capitalist economic model used in Australia and many other
countries produces winners and losers, and some elements of society may
perceive a change in the status quo as being a result of migration.
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It is important to note that the South-North distinction does not
mean that all countries in the southern hemisphere are poor and all those
in the northern hemisphere are rich. Australia and New Zealand, for
example, are considered to be part of the Global North due to their high
levels of economic development and membership in the OECD. The
primary regional arrangement in the Oceania area is the Pacific Islands
Forum (PIF) with 16 members and most member states have very small
populations. Australia is the dominant state in the region, home to about
23 million of the region’s 36 million people, and maintains an economy
five times larger than the other states combined. In comparison, many of
the small island states in the region have populations of less than 25,000
people. Australia and New Zealand are wealthy, developed OECD
members; in contrast, the vast majority of the small island states in the
region are relatively poor and underdeveloped.
With respect to regional integration outside of Oceania, Australia
and New Zealand in particular are heavily involved with their Asian
neighbors, although they are often seen as ancillary countries to the core
member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
Moreover, as “New World” immigrant countries, many Asian countries
consider them to be part of the West and outsiders in the Asian sphere. It
has been difficult for Australia to bridge this divide largely as a result of its
close ties to the United States and preference for EU-style regional
integration ("G'day Asia," 2008).
With its relatively small overall population, the Oceania region does
not play a major role in global migration, hosting 8 million of the 232
million international migrants, or just over three percent of all
international migrants. However, it is interesting to note that it has the
highest proportion of migrants of any region at 21 percent and this
increase in migration has contributed to population growth in recent
years. Australia and New Zealand are attractive destinations for
international migrants, especially from the United Kingdom, and the
region has net immigration as a result. Moreover, both of these larger
countries have implemented temporary seasonal worker programs with
the smaller Pacific Island countries in an effort to spur economic
development in the countries of origin (Hugo, 2009).
3. Prime Ministers, Politics, and Policy:
Before moving to a discussion of Australia’s policy toward
boatpeople, some background on its domestic politics in general and the
role of the prime minister in particular is helpful in shedding additional
light on how the current situation has evolved in recent years. As the

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/cecr/vol1/iss1/8

4

White: Australia’s Boatpeople Policy: Regional Cooperation or Passing the Buck?

country’s political leader, the prime minister is also a member of the
House of Representatives and leads the parliamentary party, or coalition
of parties, and is not elected directly by the Australian people. The
legislative and executive branches are therefore interconnected, which is
much different than the United States, for example, where these two
branches are kept separate. There is no fixed term for the prime minister
and he or she may face challenges from within the party or coalition and
even be removed from the leadership position.
Kevin Rudd was prime minister from November 2007 to June 2010
and resigned his post when he became decidedly unpopular with the
Australian people and his own Labor Party. Rudd’s resignation allowed
Julia Gillard, his deputy, to then become the country’s first female prime
minister. The August 2010 federal election was held shortly after Gillard
assumed the prime minister’s office and asylum seekers were a hot-button
issue in that election as well. In that respect, many observers have argued
that the current debate over asylum seekers and immigration in Australia
is nothing new and that successive governments have all tried and failed to
address the issue with an effective long-term solution.
In true soap-opera fashion, when Gillard became increasingly
unpopular after a few years in office, Rudd returned to the scene,
challenged Gillard for the Labor leadership, and then became prime
minster once again in June 2013. His “second term” would not last long
though, because his party lost the federal election on September 7, 2013
and Tony Abbott became the country’s 28th prime minister. Australia had
three different prime ministers within the span of a few months as a result
of divisions in the Labor Party and the federal election.
Rudd’s second term in office lasted less than three months, but he
managed to make a major splash in the immigration debate before his
electoral defeat in September 2013. It is often the case in richer OECD
countries that politicians tend to push more “get tough” policies on
immigration around election time. Getting labeled as soft on immigrants
is politically dangerous. However, it is important to note that the
Australian people are deeply concerned (and divided) over the asylum
seeker issue, particularly as the numbers have increased substantially. It
would be unfair to suggest that the political leadership was only engaged
in the policy debate for selfish reasons or merely to gin up xenophobia
toward foreigners in an effort to divert attention away from domestic
issues such as the weakened Australian economy.
Asylum seekers were a central concern in the run-up to the 2013
federal election and Rudd and his challenger, Tony Abbott of the
conservative opposition Liberal Party, spent a good deal of time arguing
about who was tougher on immigrants in general and the “boatpeople” in
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particular. In this respect, politics and immigration policy are intertwined
in the current debate over how to manage the influx of irregular maritime
arrivals; it is doubtful we would have seen a dramatic change in
immigration policy had there been no election in the near term. Rudd was
sworn into office for the second time on June 27, 2013 and waited less
than a month before introducing a major change in immigration policy.

Table 1
Timeline of Key Events in Australian Politics and the Immigration
Debate
Rudd loses support of his party and resigns. Gillard
June 24, 2010 elected unopposed as the Leader of the Labor Party,
thus becoming Prime Minister.
Labor electoral victory; Gillard continues as Prime
August 21, 2010
Minister.
Australian High Court rules plan to transfer migrants
August 31, 2013 from Australia to Malaysia invalid (i.e., the proposed
Malaysian Solution).
Kevin Rudd assumes office after wresting the Labor
June 27, 2013 Party leadership from the unpopular PM Julia
Gillard.
Regional Resettlement Agreement (RRA) concluded
July 19, 2013
between Australia and Papua New Guinea.
Liberal/National Coalition electoral victory; Tony
September 7, 2013
Abbott becomes Prime Minister.
September 18,
Operation Sovereign Borders commences.
2013
4. The PNG Solution:
The Australian government implemented a new policy in an
attempt to manage the recent spike in irregular migrants trying to reach its
shores. According to the Australian Department of Immigration, there
were 134 boats carrying 6,535 passengers in 2010. By 2012, there were
278 boats carrying nearly 18,000 passengers. In an effort to stem this tide
of asylum-seekers, on July 19, 2013, the Rudd government concluded the
Regional Resettlement Arrangement (RRA) with the government of Papua
New Guinea (PNG), a small country located north of the Australian state of
Queensland and bordering Indonesia to the east.1 Papua New Guinea is a
1

Full text of the RRA is available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/issues/rra-png.pdf
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diverse tribal society with a population of over six million, where some 836
indigenous languages are spoken, and is one of the region’s poorest
countries. Australia administered the Papua New Guinea territories under
a UN-trusteeship from 1949 until PNG’s independence in 1975. Relations
between the two countries have been mostly cordial and can be
characterized by a colonial legacy and economic dependence. PNG is the
closest neighboring state to Australia with a mere 2.3 miles separating
them at the nearest point, but migration between these countries is
negligible. According to the Migration Policy Institute, approximately
33,000 Papuans live in Australia and just 4,000 Australians live in PNG.
Under this new policy known as the “PNG Solution,” migrants
arriving to Australia by boat will have their asylum claims processed by
Papua New Guinea and, if successful, will be resettled there or perhaps in
another third country. Migrants that are unsuccessful in their asylum
claims will usually be repatriated to their countries of origin. The
Australian government refers to the program designed to deter boat
arrivals as “By boat, no visa.” The key aspect of the policy, as Rudd stated,
is that “any asylum seeker who arrives in Australia by boat will have no
chance of being settled in Australia as a refugee” ("Australia Says No to
More Boatpeople," 2013). Since the implementation of the PNG Solution,
Australian government officials have been adamant that there will be no
exceptions to the regional resettlement arrangement.
Australia has pledged to help refugees resettle in Papua New
Guinea and is picking up the entire cost of the extraterritorial processing
and resettlement program. There are political, economic, cultural, and
other factors involved in the decision to regionalize migration policy.
Countries may perceive advantages in some areas, but disadvantages in
others, such that regional arrangements involve multiple, and possibly
contradictory considerations. In recent decades international migration
between these countries has been characterized by a much more restrictive
policy by Australia toward Papua New Guinea, which has been a point of
contention for the latter as it would be a boost to that country’s
development. For some time Papuans seeking to travel to Australia must
obtain a visa beforehand, but a March 1, 2014 policy shift mandates that
Australians now have to do the same before traveling to PNG, meaning
there is no longer a visa-on-arrival option. This policy change can be seen
as an instance of reciprocity (or perhaps retaliation).
The Rudd government said that the primary target was the people
smugglers and not the migrants themselves: “Australians have had enough
of seeing people drowning in the waters to our north. Our country has had
enough of people smugglers exploiting asylum seekers and seeing them
drown on the high seas” (Siegel, 2013). The government believed that if it
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could deny the ability of smugglers to bring people by boat, then potential
asylum seekers would have no possible way to reach Australia. If the
smugglers could not guarantee safe passage (supply), there should be a
massive reduction in boatpeople (demand). In defending the policy, Rudd
said, “We need to be flexible enough to anticipate and match their actions
to avoid the terrible consequences of this trade. No doubt there will be
some people smugglers who now encourage asylum seekers to test our
resolve. Be in no doubt. If people are paying thousands and thousands of
dollars to a people smuggler, they are buying a ticket to a country other
than Australia” (Hall & Swan, 2013).
The sea route taken by most migrants from Indonesia has proven
extraordinarily perilous. Hundreds have died over the past five years
attempting to reach Australia on rickety fishing boats ill-equipped for the
journey. For the majority of migrants, this sea journey is the last leg of the
trip, as they have typically flown from other countries such as Iran into
Indonesia, and then attempted to reach Christmas Island, which is some
1,600 miles to the northwest of mainland Australia in the Indian Ocean
and the closest area of Australian territory to the Indonesian island of
Java.
Some of the distances involved with migrant transfers under the
RRA are mindboggling. Migrants who arrive at Christmas Island will then
be sent to the off-shore processing center at Manus Island in Papua New
Guinea, a lengthy flight covering over 2,600 miles. Papua New Guinea is
not the only off-shore processing center, however. Nauru, a tiny
Micronesian nation of just 9,400 people, also hosts an Australian facility
that currently holds over 500 asylum-seekers, mostly from Iran. Angry
detainees rioted in the summer of 2013, torching many of the center’s
buildings and fighting with police and other security personnel, venting
frustration over their accommodations and delays in processing claims.
These off-shore processing centers can be conceptualized as borders
within borders. Although the security and other personnel at the centers
come from the host country, the overwhelming majority of the population
would be segregated from the detainees. While the detainees remain at
the processing center, they are behind barbed wire and have little to no
connection to the rest of the country. Debates about migrant integration
and assimilation are completely irrelevant in this case.
After concluding the RRA, the Australian government wasted little
time putting it to use, sending the first group of 40 asylum-seekers by
plane on July 31, 2013 from Christmas Island to Manus Island in Papua
New Guinea. The government used video footage of the men departing the
detention center in its internet campaign designed to deter potential
asylum-seekers from attempting to reach Australia. In an effort to shore-
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up the new RRA, the government of Papua New Guinea has plans to
expand the Manus Island processing center to hold up to 3,000 people.
There were 1,300 detainees in February 2014.
The PNG Solution is reminiscent of the so-called Pacific Solution
implemented by the Howard government in 2001, which also involved offshore processing of asylum seekers. Ironically, this policy was abandoned
in 2007 when Rudd came into office for the first time. Like the current
PNG Solution, the Pacific Solution was a deterrence strategy against
potential asylum seekers. In addition to temporary detention, asylum
seekers who did manage to reach Australia “would be unable to work,
access health care or English language classes, or apply for their families to
join them” (McKay, 2013). The terrorist attacks against the United States
in September 2001 likely played a role in the adoption of the Pacific
Solution because these horrific events exacerbated the tendency of
Western governments to conflate asylum seekers with the threat of
terrorism.
It is widely argued that abandoning the Pacific Solution was a
colossal failure. In 2008, just 161 migrants arrived by boat compared to
nearly 18,000 in 2012, when for the first time the number of people
arriving by boat was higher than those accepted in the Australian
government’s official refugee resettlement program. However, another
perspective sees a dubious connection between the Pacific Solution and
the reduction in asylum seekers and argues that other variables offer
greater explanatory power. In any case, that many Australians prefer a
return to extraterritorial processing may seem entirely reasonable when
looking at the massive increase in maritime arrivals. The transfer of
asylum seekers to offshore processing centers was also a major component
of the Pacific Solution, and many observers have argued the new RRA
between Australia and Papua New Guinea is simply a return to this earlier
policy.
International migration is typically focused on sending and
receiving countries, or countries of origin and destination, but transit
countries can also play a key role. Indonesia, for example, is the major
transit point for asylum seekers on their way to Australia, and it would
therefore be misleading to label it a sending country. Although this paper
focuses on Australian immigration policy with a particular emphasis on
the issue of boatpeople, it is important to note that any successful and
effective immigration policy to manage these irregular maritime arrivals
will by necessity involve cooperation and coordination with Indonesia.
There is an obvious parallel to the immigration debate in the United
States regarding immigration from Mexico. Far too often this debate
occurs solely from an American perspective and tends to ignore the vital
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role that the Mexican government must play with respect to the movement
of Mexican citizens. Although the “border” relationship between Australia
and PNG is far different than that of the United States and Mexico, it is
crucial for the relationship between them to be truly bilateral, not
unilateral, only serving the interests of the dominant state.
4.1. Criticism of the PNG Solution:
Like the Pacific Solution from a decade ago, the PNG Solution has
been roundly criticized. Australia’s attempt to regionalize the processing
and resettlement of irregular maritime arrivals has been met with serious
international skepticism, particularly from human rights groups and other
advocacy organizations that question the commitment of states engaged in
extraterritorial processing to the humane treatment of asylum seekers and
other detainees (Barrowclough, 2009). Immigration and asylum issues
have been a constant in the Australian headlines, demonstrating that even
a nation with no contiguous land borders can experience significant
challenges on these issues.
Critics of the policy have accused Australia of avoiding
responsibility and shifting its migration problem to a nearby developing
nation, or simply passing the buck as this paper argues, and that the policy
in general is the “most bizarre overreaction” ("Australia's Boat People: The
PNG Solution," 2013). Australia and Papua New Guinea are parties to the
United Nations Refugee Convention, but Indonesia and Malaysia are not,
making any efforts to shift responsibility for managing refugees to the
latter two countries something of a public relations nightmare for the
Australian government. The proposed “people swap” with Malaysia never
came to fruition because the Australian High Court ruled that the plan was
unlawful in 2011 (Hall, 2013) .
Outsourcing migration through efforts like extraterritorial
processing is generally frowned upon by the international community.
The following is a key statement related to the issue from the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2013):
As a principle, UNHCR always advocates for countries to grant
protection within their own territory, regardless of how they have
arrived… Overall, UNHCR believes that greater cooperative efforts
need to be found to address the complex challenges of irregular
maritime movements. The focus must remain on finding ways that
complement – rather than undermine – national asylum systems
built on the fundamental principles of the 1951 Refugee Convention.
This is important for the countries involved, for the global asylum
system, and for all those in need of international protection.
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After the conclusion of the RRA between Australia and Papua New Guinea,
the UNHCR assessed the new policy and expressed some serious concerns
related to the arrangement. The assessment reads in part (UNHCR, 2013):
With regard to the new measures, UNHCR is troubled by the
current absence of adequate protection standards and safeguards
for asylum seekers and refugees in Papua New Guinea (PNG).
Australia’s Regional Resettlement Arrangement (RRA) with the
Government of PNG raises serious, and so far unanswered,
protection questions.
The agency also believes the program will face “significant policy, legal,
and operational challenges.” Finally, the UNHCR maintains that PNG has
“a lack of national capacity and expertise in processing, and poor physical
conditions within open-ended, mandatory and arbitrary detention
settings. This can be harmful to the physical and psycho-social well-being
of transferees, particularly families and children.” Representatives from
the UNHCR and other asylum-seeker advocacy groups said the hot,
humid, cramped, and crowded conditions at the Manus Island center
would adversely affect the health of detainees ("Manus Island Policy Fails
Asylum Seekers," 2013). Moreover, these representatives argued that
protections for vulnerable people like children and the elderly are severely
lacking.
Despite the efforts of human rights organizations and other
advocacy groups, nation-states like Australia maintain the ability to
manage migration as they see fit, meaning non-governmental actors may
not have such a significant impact on policy considerations (Opeskin,
2012). States control their borders and what happens within them.
Politicians who want to stay in office are wise to seek policies that reflect
the majority opinion of their domestic constituencies. Many Australians
are opposed to the particulars of the PNG Solution, but the vast majority
wanted the government to do something about the increase in boatpeople.
Some observers have suggested that the Australia-Papua New
Guinea arrangement could set a precedent and negatively affect the
international protection regime, particularly the reliance on
extraterritorial processing (Siegel, 2013). In addition to questions
surrounding the efficacy of extraterritorial processing, there have been
concerns related to the conditions faced by detainees at the Manus Island
processing center in Papua New Guinea. Tony Burke, Australia’s
Immigration Minister prior to the September 2013 Coalition victory,
visited the Manus center to investigate claims of assault, rape, and torture.
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There are also reports that many inmates have tried to harm themselves,
with some even attempting suicide ("Australia to Probe Migrant Rape
Claims in PNG," 2013). Critics have voiced concerns that the processing
center was under-resourced before the regional arrangement was
concluded, especially in light of Papua New Guinea’s low level of
development, and that the center is ill-prepared to handle greater numbers
of asylum seekers and other vulnerable people that may result as a
consequence of the arrangement.
Although the RRA was concluded under the Labor government and
has continued as Operation Sovereign Borders under the Coalition
government, it is important to note that other political parties in Australia
are adamantly opposed to these buck-passing policies. The leader of the
Australian Greens, Christine Milne, said it was “absolutely immoral” for
her country to “dump thousands of vulnerable people into an
impoverished country” (Hall & Swan, 2013). Many Australians have found
the notion that Australia cannot manage its own immigration perplexing
and question why it is even necessary to involve regional neighbors. Peter
Hartcher (2013), for instance, has opined, “The Greens are certainly
correct that Australia should try to be as decent a country as possible. We
have the best living conditions among all the rich nations on earth,
according to the OECD's Better Lives index. If Australia cannot afford to
be decent, who can?”
International organizations and other advocacy groups, including
religious institutions, have also joined in the criticism. A number of
Australian churches have condemned the government’s policy as heartless.
Graeme McGregor, Amnesty International’s regional refugee coordinator,
stated forcefully, “Mark this day in history as the day Australia decided to
turn its back on the world's most vulnerable people, closed the door and
threw away the key” ("Australia Says No to More Boatpeople," 2013). In
addition, Paul Power of the Refugee Council of Australia has argued, “By
unreasonably shifting its responsibilities for asylum seekers to Papua New
Guinea through this Regional Resettlement Arrangement (RRA),
Australia’s international advocacy for responsibility sharing has been
exposed as hollow and hypocritical. This arrangement is without
precedent in the world. It cannot possibly be presented as an example of
regional cooperation because it is little more than a wealthy country
paying a much weaker neighbor to take on its international responsibilities
to people seeking asylum ("Deaths after Refugee Boat Sinks off Indonesia,"
2013). There is a widespread perception that Australia has merely
incentivized Papua New Guinea’s cooperation through dangling an
economic carrot in the form of increased foreign aid in such areas as
security, health, and education, especially reform of its university system.
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Official development assistance from Australia to PNG surpassed $500
million in 2013 and is a critical component of its economy. Moreover, the
PNG-Australia Partnership for Development was concluded in 2008 and is
designed to assist PNG in meeting the Millennium Development Goals.
Although most of the focus is centered on Australia, Papua New
Guinea obviously plays a key role as the off-shore processor of choice, but
there are critics in that government as well. Former Papua New Guinea
opposition leader Dame Carol Kidu said, “We are facing many problems
ourselves, and to me I think it could be an increased problem. It's called
the PNG solution but I think it's more of an Australia solution” ("Australia
PM Kevin Rudd Defends PNG Asylum Deal," 2013).
As stated earlier, Papua New Guinea has a low level of development.
Approximately 85% of the population is engaged in subsistence farming,
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in 2013 was a mere $2,900, and
nearly 40% of the population was below the poverty line. Thus, it should
come as no surprise that the people of Papua New Guinea are less than
thrilled about the potential influx of asylum seekers that could eventually
be resettled there as a result of the arrangement. The following table
demonstrates the marked gap between Australia and PNG across a
number of key indicators.

Table 2
Australia and Papua New Guinea Compared
Population (millions)
GDP per capita (in USD)
GDP (PPP in billions of dollars)
Urbanization (% of population)
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 births)
Life expectancy at birth (years)
Fertility rate (children born/woman)
Birth rate (births/1,000 population)
Health expenditures (% of GDP)
Children under 5 years underweight (% of pop.)
Literacy (% of pop.)
Internet users (in thousands)
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Australia
22.5
43,000
998.3
89
4.43
82.07
1.77
12.19
9
0.2
99
15,810

PNG
6.5
2,900
19.7
13
39.67
66.85
3.24
24.89
4.3
18.1
62.4
125
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5. New Leader, Same Problem:
Since his electoral victory, Prime Minister Tony Abbott has been in
the uncomfortable position of working with regional governments that he
had previously criticized and whose effectiveness he had questioned as
offshore processing centers. He was highly skeptical of the PNG Solution
prior to the election, and in general the Coalition favored less involvement
by regional neighbors. In the heat of the campaign Abbott said in a
speech: “'I say to Mr. Rudd: stop making excuses, stop trying to say this is
the world's problem. It's not. It's our problem and we need to take the
appropriate action in this country, by this country, for this country to stop
the boats and we need to do it now” (Hall, 2013). However, since the
election, Abbott has by no means turned away from the arrangement. In
fact, the new administration has continued to enforce the PNG Solution,
transitioning to the Operation Sovereign Borders program shortly after the
election. The Abbott government made the calculation that keeping the
PNG Solution was advantageous to scrapping the policy and attempting
some new method of managing irregular maritime arrivals. After
assuming office under the Coalition government, Immigration Minister
Scott Morrison said there would be no exemptions to the policy, even
pregnant women, who for the first time since 2004 will give birth in
offshore processing centers instead of Australia (Aston, 2013).
Papua New Guinea may not play a central role in Australian
policymaking, but the concerns of that government are also important,
because there would be no RRA without its agreement. Peter O’Neill came
into the prime minister’s office in August 2012 and has served as the
leader of Papua New Guinea during the Gillard, Rudd, and Abbott
governments in Australia. If Abbott had chosen to renege on the RRA with
Papua New Guinea after his election, it would have likely been viewed as a
political slap in the face with accompanying charges of obsequiousness to
the whims of the Australian government.
Although asylum seekers were a key voter issue in the 2013 election,
overall dissatisfaction with the Labor government likely played a far
greater role in the Coalition victory than did public opinion related to the
immigration debate. Abbott called for a military-led border protection
solution, now known as Operation Sovereign Borders or the “stop the
boats” policy. His Liberal Party repeatedly accused the Labor government
of being soft on asylum seekers, which many observers suggest played a
role in the establishment of Rudd’s get-tough policy. As prime minister,
he has argued that irregular maritime arrivals are a serious concern for the
country and the problem must be addressed expediently.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/cecr/vol1/iss1/8

14

White: Australia’s Boatpeople Policy: Regional Cooperation or Passing the Buck?

Abbott has quickly discovered that some regional cooperation may
be necessary instead of Australia managing the migration problem alone
and that these bilateral and multilateral relations must be handled
carefully. His government has attempted to buy-back boats and pay locals
for information about people smuggling operations; he even had the
Australian navy try to tow migrant-smuggling boats back to Indonesia.
These more aggressive moves did not sit well with the Indonesian
government, which viewed such actions as a threat to its sovereignty. In
his first major meeting abroad with Indonesian President Yudhoyono,
Abbott attempted to recast the issue as a bilateral problem and one that
would necessitate greater cooperation and coordination to prevent future
humanitarian disasters. Exactly how Indonesian cooperation will fit in
with the arrangement between Australia and Papua New Guinea is yet to
be determined. However, the Indonesian government has clearly stated
that it will not permit the Australian navy and customs service to return
boatpeople, except for rare, extreme circumstances (Alford, 2013).
6. Migration Panic:
Although the number of asylum seekers arriving by boat is
relatively small, particularly when considering Australia’s vast
geographical territory and its population of nearly 23 million, the actual
problem of boatpeople has been grossly exaggerated in much the same way
it often is in other countries that are dealing with a sudden influx. In the
vast majority of destination countries people are concerned about the
government’s ability to secure and manage the nation’s borders, especially
in times of greater economic stress, and immigrants are viewed as a threat
to national sovereignty.
Moreover, politicians seeking to score points have shifted toward
“get tough” rhetoric and policies in an effort to mollify a fearful domestic
constituency. According to Hall (2013), immigration correspondent with
the Sydney Morning Herald, “Breaking the spirit of asylum seekers is seen
as the only way to stop the boats as the major parties vie for the toughest
stance” and “the way Australia reacts to asylum seekers coming to our
shores by boat has been a political–rather than policy–question.”
Australian immigration policy has reflected a racial and
xenophobic component in the past, most notoriously with the Immigration
Restriction Act of 1901, otherwise known as the “White Australia” policy,
which demonstrated a clear preference for British migrants. It was not
until 1975 with the passage of the Racial Discrimination Act that all traces
of this policy ended. Australia has traditionally been more comfortable
with migration from the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and other
predominantly “Anglo” countries. However, in recent decades the typical
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asylum seeker has not been of European origin, with the majority coming
from Iraq, Iran, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh ("Australia to
Send Asylum-Seekers to PNG," 2013). These migrants are mostly young
and male. More asylum seekers tried to reach Australia by boat following
the end of the Cold War, but these numbers increased even further by the
late 1990s. Instability in the Middle East and Southeast Asia has been a
key push factor for migration in recent decades.
This demographic shift in those seeking new lives in Australia has
been a source of concern for many native-born Australians. According to
the Migration Policy Institute,
Scholars have noted Australians' hardening attitudes toward lowskilled, non-white migrants such as Middle Easterners and Asians
for more than a decade, driven by fear the migrants could alter the
national identity and culture of Australia for the worse. In a
historical context, the country's national identity is rooted in its
predominantly white immigration history. As well, Australia's boat
people are seen by many as queue jumpers and unauthorized
immigrants – not genuine refugees (Foulkes, 2012).
The vast majority of the 47,000 boatpeople over the past five years were
genuine refugees, however, and not merely economic migrants. Reflecting
this queue-jumper perspective, the Australian government has adopted
the “no advantage” test, where boat arrivals have no advantage compared
to others as far as the resettlement program.
There is evidence that the Australian public’s attitude toward
irregular migrants has hardened in recent years, however, as the number
of asylum seekers has grown dramatically and more people have died
attempting to make the journey. Politicians from across the political
spectrum have labeled the situation as “out of control”, which contributes
to the public’s sense that the government is unwilling or unable to enforce
the border, or both.
A look at the statistics concerning asylum seekers, refugees, and
other persons of concern points to the fact that Australia is not a major
destination country for irregular migrants, especially when compared to
many of its peer OECD countries, although there has been a marked
increase in recent years in both the number of boats and the number of
migrants trying to reach Australia. According to the UNHCR (2013b), at
the end of 2012 Australia hosted 30,083 refugees (one of the lowest rates
among OECD countries both in absolute and relative terms) and 20,010
asylum seekers for a total population of concern of approximately 50,000.
In contrast, the total populations of concern in other states are
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substantially higher: 680,000 in Germany, 269,000 in France, 170,000 in
the United Kingdom, 196,000 in Canada, and 281,000 in the United
States. In 2012, almost 894,000 applications for asylum or refugee status
were submitted to national governments or to UNHCR offices. These
countries have far larger populations of course, but the total number of
persons of concern in Australia is nowhere near out of control in relation
to its population when compared to its peer countries.
As is the case in many other migration destinations, the financial
cost to the taxpayer is substantial and rising. In 2012, the Australian
Immigration Department is expected to have spent $2.2 billion managing
arrivals, and this figure will likely be significantly higher in 2013
(Hartcher, 2013). It is hard to argue that these sums are insignificant, and
$2.2 billion divided by 17,200 arrivals comes to around $128,000 per
migrant – no small amount.
The issue of irregular maritime arrivals is a serious one. Deaths of
hundreds of migrants at sea, particularly children, raise clear ethical and
moral questions when considering appropriate policy. Australia, as one of
the richest, most highly developed states in the world today, should be able
to manage its immigration policy while simultaneously protecting national
security and state interests. It is a strong democracy with highly effective
governmental institutions, a favorable reputation internationally, and a
robust economy. Although it has tried to maintain close relations with
PNG, the regional resettlement arrangement does not adequately reflect
international norms and obligations with respect to asylum seekers and
other persons of concern.
7. Conclusion:
The PNG Solution began in July 2013 and transitioned into
Operation Sovereign Borders after the federal election in September. The
new Australian government pointed to a decrease in irregular maritime
migrants in the first 100 days of the operation as evidence that the policy is
working and that the government has managed to deter people-smugglers.
However, the fact remains that significant push and pull factors exist that
encourage (or force) migrants to leave their countries of origin with the
hope of a new life elsewhere. Indeed, there seems to be a widely held view
among migrants that the new resettlement arrangement will not deter
them from trying to reach Australia.
Past experience may also be instructive in this case. Officials
responsible for the enforcement of the 2001 Pacific Solution have
expressed concern over the PNG Solution and Operation Sovereign
Borders. There is a strong argument to be made that unless conditions
change at the source, in sending countries, it will be extraordinarily
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difficult for destination countries like Australia to deter potential
migrants. This is a salient theme in border studies and regional
integration and reflects host-nation fears of hordes of immigrants
streaming into the country. People fleeing difficult situations in places like
Afghanistan and Bangladesh may see migration as their only option.
Jon Stanhope, Administrator of the Australian Indian Ocean
Territories, which includes Christmas Island, is not in favor of the regional
arrangement, but believes it has deterred migrants since there has been a
decline in the number of boats and asylum seekers. He questioned the
ultimate aim of the policy: “Is that the indicator of success that any asylum
seeker that gets to Australia is immediately deported? Or is a key
performance indicator or an indicator of success that you acted with
compassion; that you acted with humanity?” (Norman, 2013). Stanhope
points to the notion that simply because a policy may be working does not
mean it is good policy; the means may not be justified to reach a specific
end.
Related to border theory, there must be a realization that what
might be good for governments might not be good for migrants. For
example, deportation policies in the United States might be effective in
returning undocumented migrants to their countries of origin, but these
policies have been incredibly destructive to families and communities.
Migration policies, like other high-level government considerations,
involve cascading effects and often entail unforeseen and even unwanted
secondary consequences. The regional arrangement between Australia
and PNG can be conceptualized in the same way. These governments have
not adequately addressed the human rights of the asylum seekers.
As a member of the UN Refugee Convention, Australia must fulfill
its obligations under international law without resorting to extraterritorial
processing and other measures designed to outsource its immigration
policy. As the desired destination country, Australia is the key factor in
the regional arrangement, but Papua New Guinea also shares
responsibility. Neither side should be able to completely shift blame for
inadequate conditions and protections for the asylum seekers.
Undoubtedly a significant share of those seeking to reach Australia are
economic migrants, but many of the “boatpeople” are fleeing some of the
world’s most unstable and dangerous places, and appropriate policies and
safeguards must be met. In conjunction with external actors including the
UNHCR, regional governments, international organizations and advocacy
groups, the Australian government should pursue a non-extraterritorial
immigration policy that addresses the needs of asylum seekers effectively,
but humanely.
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